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How did you originally get interested in philosophy? 
I met philosophy early. I read much as a child, and occasionally came across refer-
ences to  philosophy.  I didn’t understand what it meant, but  I was curious, and 
when I was 12 years old, I asked my mother to buy me a copy of Will Durant’s The 
Story of Philosophy: the Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers. I can’t claim 
to have understood much at that age, but Durant’s account of Plato was still so in-
spiring that I there and then decided that I wanted to study philosophy. And that 
was basically a decision I stuck to, and which I have never regretted.  It made me 
opt for modern languages in the gymnasium, since I wanted to learn German so 
that I could read Kant and study in Germany. Right after the gymnasium, I enrolled 
as a philosophy student at the University of Copenhagen. Initially I was mostly in-
terested in the history of philosophy (Aristotle,  Thomas Aquinas and  Kant), but 
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eventually I got interested in Husserl, which I back then took to be an interesting 
synthesis of Aristotle and Kant. So I decided to write my MA thesis on him, and it 
was on this occasion that I finally realized my plans about studying abroad. I went 
to Wuppertal in Germany to study with the renowned Husserl-scholar Klaus Held. 
Held had been the assistant of Landgrebe, who himself had been one of Husserl’s 
assistants. In the spring of 1991, I handed in my MA thesis which was entitled In-
tentionalität und Konstitution. It also became my first book (Zahavi 1992).  
By then I had decided that I wanted to write a PhD. I was lucky enough to obtain 
scholarship and went to the Husserl Archives at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
in order to work with Rudolf Bernet as my doctoral supervisor. In 1994, I success-
fully defended my thesis Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität, which 
later was also published as a book (Zahavi 1996). By then, if not sooner, I was al-
ready set on an academic path with phenomenology as main area of focus. After 
some years as post.doc and assistant professor in Paris and Copenhagen, and after 
having written and defended my habilitation Self-awareness and alterity (Zahavi 
1999), I submitted an application to the Danish National Research Foundation to-
gether with two colleagues, Arne Grøn and Josef Parnas. The application was suc-
cessful and in 2002 allowed me to establish the Center for Subjectivity Research, 
which I have directed ever since. In 2006, I obtained a permanent position as pro-
fessor  of  philosophy  at  the  University  of  Copenhagen.  Whereas  my  own  back-
ground is strictly in philosophy, and whereas I initially worked alone, and only 
with philosophy, after the establishment of the Center for Subjectivity Research I 
increasingly  started  to  collaborate  with  other  people,  including  empirical  re-
searchers such as the psychiatrist Josef Parnas, the clinical psychologist Louis Sass, 
the  developmental  psychologist  Philippe  Rochat  and  the  neuroscientist  Andreas 
Roepstorff.  Philosophers  I  have  collaborated  with  include  Shaun  Gallagher  and 
Evan Thompson. Together with the two latter, I have now for a number of years 
been involved in an attempt to build bridges between phenomenology, philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science. 
 
What do you regard as your most important contribution to philosophy?  
Since my master thesis I have worked on phenomenology; a philosophical tradition 
established by Husserl (1859-1938) which in many ways can be said to constitute 
the cornerstone of what today frequently, and somewhat misleadingly, is called 
Continental philosophy. Briefly put, phenomenology might be characterized as a 
philosophical analysis of different modes of appearance and related hereto as a 
reflective investigation of those forms of understanding and structures of expe-
rience that allow the objects to show themselves as what they are. From the outset, 
I took it to be important to bring phenomenology into dialogue with other philo-
sophical traditions. In my PhD I drew on critical theory (Habermas), in my habilita-
tion it was the Heidelberg school (Henrich and Frank) and analytical philosophy of 
language and philosophy of mind (in particular Rosenthal, Anscombe, Perry, Cas-Philosophical Interviews  
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tañeda and Armstrong). After the Center for Subjectivity Research was established, 
my  methodological  and  theoretical  pluralism  has  only  become  even  more  pro-
nounced. 
In my PhD, I presented a new interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivi-
ty. I argued that Husserl’s main reason for dwelling so much on the topic of inter-
subjectivity was transcendentally motivated, and that his phenomenology would 
ultimately  have  to  be  appreciated  as  an  intersubjective  transformation  of  tran-
scendental philosophy. In other words, rather than being interested in the basic 
building blocks of reality, Husserl was concerned with the transcendental philo-
sophical question about what it means for something to be real, and how we can 
experience it as such. He defended the view that these questions couldn’t be ans-
wered on the basis of an isolated subject, but only by considering the contribution 
of the intersubjective community. I also discussed Sartre’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Heidegger’s  contribution  to  a  phenomenological  theory  of  intersubjectivity,  and 
stressed the common features and virtues of such analyses when compared to the 
language-oriented approach to intersubjectivity found in Habermas and Apel. My 
PhD was published in the spring of 1996, a few months after Anthony Steinbock 
and Natalie Depraz had published their respective analyzes of Husserl’s theory of 
intersubjectivity. The three books are all different, and deal with different aspects 
of Husserl’s theory. But they are all characterized by drawing on a quite compre-
hensive amount of sources and by their rejection of the traditional reading of Hus-
serl as a quasi-solipsist.  Since then, all three of us have often been classified as 
representing a new generation of (revisionist) Husserl scholars. A more overarch-
ing presentation of my reinterpretation of Husserl – which responds to the wide-
spread portray (caricature) of Husserl as a subjective idealist, intellectualist, im-
manentist etc. – can be found in the book Husserl’s Phenomenology, which in the 
meantime has been translated into a wide range of languages (Zahavi 2003a).    
In my habilitation, I defended the concept of pre-reflective self-consciousness, i.e., 
the idea that our experiential life is characterized by a form of self-consciousness 
which is more primitive and more fundamental than the reflective form of self-
consciousness that one for instance finds in various kinds of introspection. I pre-
sented  a  detailed  reading  of  Husserl’s  analysis  of  self-consciousness  and  inner 
time-consciousness  (which  criticized  Sokolowski’s  and  Brough’s  internal  object 
model), and demonstrated more generally, by also drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Sar-
tre, Henry and Derrida, how central and fundamental a role the concept of self-
consciousness  plays  in  phenomenological  philosophy.  Phenomenology  hasn’t 
merely been interested in the question of how consciousness is involved in the 
appearance of objects, but has also inquired into the self-appearance of conscious-
ness. The book is probably the most exhaustive discussion of phenomenological 
accounts of self-consciousness, and was in 2000 awarded with the Edward Good-
win Ballard Prize in Phenomenology.   
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My research in the years that followed has continued to address the same basic 
issues. On the one hand, I have been preoccupied with the relationship between 
experience, self and self-consciousness. I have argued that all three concepts are 
interdependent and that a theory of consciousness which wish to take the subjec-
tive dimension of our experiential life seriously also needs to operate with a (mi-
nimal) concept of self. Opponents have included those who either deny the reality 
of the self or who claim that the self is a social construct whose formation requires 
language and concept use, normativity and narratives. As part of this work I have 
investigated  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  narrative  account  of  self,  dis-
cussed and criticized various forms of self-skepticism, and examined some of the 
forms  of  self-disorders  that  we  find  in  schizophrenia  (cf.  Zahavi  2003b,  2005, 
2007a, Sass, Parnas, Zahavi 2011). During the last few years, this interest has also 
gone  in  a  more  intercultural  direction.  I  have  started  to  work  with  experts  in 
Buddhist philosophy from USA, Australia and South Korea. Our ongoing work is 
aimed at better understanding the similarities and differences between the con-
cepts of self that the different traditions are operating with (see Siderits, Thomp-
son, Zahavi 2011).   
On the other hand, I have continued to write on intersubjectivity, empathy and 
social cognition. I have defended a phenomenological account of empathy, argued 
in favor of the bodily and contextual character of interpersonal understanding and 
criticized dominant positions within the so-called ’theory of mind’ debate, includ-
ing simulations theory and theory-theory. As part of this work, I have also spent 
time discussing and criticizing some of the standard accounts of autism, including 
the claim that the reason why people with autism have difficulties understanding 
and  interacting  with  others  is  due  to  deficiencies  in  their  theoretical  capacities 
(Zahavi 2001, 2008b, Zahavi & Parnas 2003).   
Most recently, I have started to study social emotions like shame (Zahavi 2010a). 
My interest is mainly due to the fact that such emotions do not merely express a 
concise form of self-experience, but that they at the same time involve relations to 
others. In the next few years I intend to continue working on various forms of so-
cially mediated self-experience.  
In parallel with my systematic work in these areas, I have on the one hand contin-
ued my Husserl research, where I, for instance, have discussed the metaphysical 
implications of transcendental phenomenology: Can the phenomenological clarifi-
cation of the lifeworld and of the structure of experience tell us something about 
the nature of reality itself (see Zahavi 2008c), and on the other, I have sought to 
establish and promote increasing cooperation between phenomenology, analytical 
philosophy of mind, and cognitive science (in particular development psychology 
and psychopathology). The latter effort brought me in 2006 the Elite Research Prize 
of the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. Two representative 
publications  are  the  books  Subjectivity  and  Selfhood  from  2005  and  The Philosophical Interviews  
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Phenomenological  Mind  from  2008.  The  latter  book  is  co-authored  with  Shaun 
Gallagher  with  whom  I  am  also  co-editing  the  journal  Phenomenology  and  the 
Cognitive Sciences. 
Although I initially to a large extent identified myself with Husserlian phenome-
nology,  I  eventually  found  the  disagreements  which  have  marked  the  relations 
between  the  different  traditions  in  phenomenology  more  and  more  counter-
productive. I will certainly not deny that it can be useful to focus on the difference 
between, for example, Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s under-
standing of phenomenology, but too much emphasis on the difference does not 
only run the risk of degenerating into a kind of trench war which is anything but 
philosophical fruitful, it also weakens the effort to make phenomenology a power-
ful and systematically convincing voice in contemporary philosophical discussion. 
For the same reason, I have in the last year been increasingly more eclectic in my 
use of the resources that can be found in phenomenology (cf. Zahavi 2003c, 2007b, 
2008d). The same attitude has also characterized my work in the Nordic Society for 
Phenomenology which I, together with Hans Ruin and Sara Heinämaa took the in-
itiative to establish in 2001, and which I was then president for in 6 years.   
 
What are the main open problems within your area of philosophy?  
I will not deny that one might talk of progress, development and results in the field 
of philosophy, but I doubt that a number of the fundamental philosophical prob-
lems will ever be resolved in a way which will satisfy all future generations. In 
other words, I do not believe that we at some point will be able to close the debate, 
so that we from then on no longer have to deal with and wonder about what it for 
instance means that something is real, what it means to be a self, etc. For the same 
reason, I also think that most of the systematic problems I work with are and will 
remain open.   
Some problems are however more urgent than others, and among the latter, one 
might for instance mention some of the methodological challenges which the ever 
more dominant naturalism has occasioned.  
How, for example, should one for instance view the relationship between the first-
person perspective, the second-person perspective and third-person perspective on 
consciousness?  We know what it feels like to feel disgust at the sight and smell of 
spoiled food. We are able to recognize the disgust in the facial expressions of oth-
ers. Neuroscience is increasingly able to locate and identify the areas of the brain 
that are active when we have these types of experiences. What is still missing is a 
real theoretical integration of these different perspectives. Such integration is es-
sential, if we are to do justice to the complexity of consciousness, but it is in no way 
obvious how natural science all by itself will be able to do so.  
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A related problem concerns the  relationship  between philosophy and  empirical 
research. I do not believe that philosophical considerations as such can be made 
superfluous or be replaced by empirical research – therefore, I also oppose the 
idea that philosophy ought to be naturalised, if that is meant to entail the sugges-
tion that it should be made part of or an extension of natural science – but I do not 
think it is healthy for those branches of philosophy that I work in to operate in a 
vacuum without any contact to empirical research.  The challenge is to find the 
right balance – where the unique contribution of philosophy is respected while 
strengthening the interdisciplinary collaboration (Zahavi 2010b, Zahavi & Roeps-
torff 2011, Rochat & Zahavi 2011).   
 
How do you view the relationship between philosophy, other sciences and the 
world outside on science?  
It is fairly straightforward to show that the questions I am primarily dealing with – 
the nature of the self and its relation to others – are questions with immediate exis-
tential relevance  to  most people. Who has not considered the question  of what 
makes up one’s self-identity? Are you the same from birth to death? Can radical 
changes in one’s values and convictions change one so much that one becomes 
another? Can one be a self alone, or only together with others as members of a 
community? How do we understand others in the first place? Can we at all expe-
rience others, or are we always strangers to one another? But as already indicated 
above, such questions are also central to a large number of empirical disciplines, 
including developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, sociolo-
gy, psychiatry and neuroscience. We find references to self and other in various 
explorations  of  perception,  action,  embodiment,  emotions,  memory,  etc.  It  is  in 
particular this fact which makes the questions so fascinating, and while one as a 
philosopher can learn quite a lot about the issues in question by a study of the em-
pirical findings, there is also something deeply satisfying about seeing how a philo-
sophical analysis of, for example, self-consciousness or empathy can be of relev-
ance and inspiration to empirical researchers, such as psychiatrists and develop-
mental psychologists.   
 
What role want you to the philosophy must play in the future?  
Fundamentally speaking, I see three tasks for philosophy:  
First of all, it has the role of being a transmitter of traditions. The theories we to-
day make use of didn’t arise out of the blue. They have a historical origin, and by 
better understanding their background and the alternatives which have been de-
veloped over time, we are also in a better position to assess their strengths and 
limitations. Take as an example consciousness research. The field has undergone 
something of a renaissance during the last 20 years. But the topic itself is hardly 
new. Just think of the exploration and analysis of consciousness that one finds in Philosophical Interviews  
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philosopher  such  as  Descartes,  Locke,  Leibniz,  Hume,  Kant,  Hegel,  Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, James, Dilthey and Bergson. By ignoring the resources found in the tra-
dition, one risks missing out on important insights that at best might be redisco-
vered decades or centuries later.   
Although contemporary neuroscience on several occasions has criticized philoso-
phy for not having made any progress or produced anything of lasting value dur-
ing the last 2,500 years, familiarity with the history of philosophy will reveal the 
extent to which 17
th Century epistemology and metaphysics, including its under-
standing of the structure of perception and nature of reality, of what is subjective 
and  objective,  continues  to  influence,  in  a  not  entirely  harmless  way,  cognitive 
neuroscience. I consequently see history of philosophy as absolutely central to the 
work of philosophy.   
Secondly, I think that philosophy has a critical task. It should raise and pose critical 
questions to contemporary dogmas, including the scientific ones. It should be a 
safeguard against a too facile reductionism, for example, one that would claim that 
everything  must  be  explained  by  the  theoretical  resources  we  currently  have 
available, and that that which cannot be so explained must be rejected as fiction. 
Here, philosophical training can remind us of how little we know. It will be able to 
insist on the complexity of the problems we are facing while nurturing an intellec-
tual openness to new, original ideas.   
Finally, I also think that philosophy has a constructive role to play. Not only can it 
contribute positively to the clarification of a number of problems that it shares 
with various empirical disciplines, but I also think that there are issues and prob-
lems belonging to the domain of, say, metaethics, transcendental philosophy, me-
taphysics and part of epistemology, which are specific to philosophy, and where it 
can make a unique contribution. 
I hope that philosophy in the future will continue to flourish in all three areas. Re-
ality is complex, and in order to do this complexity justice we need a diversity of 
complementary  perspectives.  This  applies  not  only  to  the  relationship  between 
theoretical (philosophical) and empirical perspectives, it is also relevant to philos-
ophy per se. Rather than to see it as a weakness, I regard the diversity of philo-
sophical traditions as a strength. This obviously doesn’t mean that everything is 
equally valid. But it is possible to do excellent philosophy in more than one way.   
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